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Note*
The Silence of Gideon’s Trumpet: The
Court’s Inattention to Systemic
Inequities Causing Violations of
Speedy Trial Rights in Vermont
v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009)
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I. INTRODUCTION
Assigned counsel has become a vital component of the American
legal landscape largely due to the Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in
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Gideon v. Wainwright.1  The Supreme Court’s decisions regarding
Sixth Amendment rights and the indigent defendant’s right to counsel
created a legal backdrop in which the Court may be petitioned by indi-
gent defendants who have had their constitutional rights substan-
tially affected by the quality of their assigned counsel.  Speedy trial
rights, in particular, may be vitiated or vindicated based on the qual-
ity of assigned counsel and the systems put in place to assign and su-
pervise attorneys who represent indigent defendants. Vermont v.
Brillon2 highlights the interplay between the Court’s decisions re-
garding speedy trial rights and indigent defense.
In Vermont v. Brillon, the Supreme Court held that Michael Bril-
lon’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights had not been violated be-
cause the factors that caused his trial to be delayed for over three
years were largely attributable to Brillon and his assigned counsel.3
The ruling reversed the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision4 that the
prolonged detention violated Brillon’s speedy trial rights.  Brillon was
initially convicted at trial of domestic felony assault and sentenced to
between twelve and twenty years in prison.5  The key issue on appeal
was whether the periods of delay caused by his assigned counsel
should be attributed to Brillon and his assigned counsel or to the
State.6  The Vermont Supreme Court attributed much of the delay to
the State of Vermont and ordered the charges against Brillon dis-
missed due to violation of his right to speedy trial.7
Upon review, the U.S. Supreme Court used a four-part balancing
test, as first expressed in Barker v. Wingo,8 to structure its inquiry.9
The Supreme Court, finding its decision to be in line with historical
precedent, made clear that it viewed assigned counsel as typically not
being a state actor.10  Thus, delays caused by either the assigned
counsel or the defendant will be attributed to the defendant in a
speedy trial analysis.11 Brillon presented an opportunity for the
Court to evaluate the relationship between vitiating constitutional
rights and the quality of assigned counsel.  The Court briefly dis-
cussed a contrary rule, one in which assigned counsel and private
counsel are treated differently for purposes of a speedy trial analysis,
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009).
3. Id. at 1287.
4. State v. Brillon, 955 A.2d 1108 (Vt. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009).
5. Id. at 1113.
6. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. at 1290.
7. Brillon, 955 A.2d at 1111 (concluding that the Defender General’s Office is part of
the criminal justice system and thus the ultimate responsibility of the State).
8. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
9. See Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283.
10. Id. at 1287 (holding that both assigned and retained counsel act on behalf of their
client).
11. Id. at 1290–91.
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and concluded that it would lead to inequities in the legal system12—
such as the granting of possibly greater constitutional protections to
indigent defendants than to defendants who retain private counsel.13
Instead, the Court in Brillon concluded that all defendants, indigent
or otherwise, are generally responsible for delays caused by assigned
counsel, whether assigned or private.14
In reversing the Vermont Supreme Court, the Court wrote a rela-
tively succinct decision, but the decision is significant because the
Court discussed in some detail how periods of pre-trial delay should be
attributed to either the state or the defendant.  The Court’s decision
makes clear that indigent defendants must climb a large barrier in
order to attribute their assigned counsel’s action, or inaction, to the
state.  The Court’s decision displays an approach to speedy trial rights
that is not particularly consistent with its Gideon ruling.  This discus-
sion focuses on the tension between Brillon and Gideon, along with
the possible future impact of the Brillon decision on other courts.  In
Part II, this Note examines the background of contemporary speedy
trial rights analysis and the role of Gideon in granting indigent de-
fendants the right to counsel.  This Note also briefly discusses the lib-
erty interests protected by Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights.  Part
III discusses the interplay between Gideon and Brillon and how the
four-part Barker analysis can be applied in a way that alleviates some
of the inherent tension between speedy trial rights analysis and evalu-
ation of an indigent defendant’s right to counsel.
Barker v. Wingo,15 Gideon v. Wainwright,16 and Vermont v. Bril-
lon17 discuss principles and declarations of rights that can be used
effectively in future cases.  However, the foregoing cases and discus-
sion demonstrate the need for a more responsive jurisprudence re-
garding speedy trial rights and the indigent defendant’s right to
counsel.  As a step towards addressing these issues, this Note pro-
poses that future Supreme Court decisions should acknowledge the
effects indigent defense systems have on the quality of legal presenta-
tion provided to indigent defendants.  By doing so, the Court will help
realize the promise of Gideon and ensure the protection of constitu-
tional rights for indigent defendants.18
12. Id. at 1292.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1290–91.
15. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
16. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
17. 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009).
18. But see Lewis LeNaire, Comment, Vermont v. Brillon: Public Defense and the
Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 219 (2010)
(agreeing with the Court’s resolution of the case but discussing the many unan-
swered questions left in its wake).
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-2\NEB201.txt unknown Seq: 4 29-NOV-10 14:24
2010] THE SILENCE OF GIDEON’S TRUMPET 399
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Sixth Amendment: The Rights to Counsel and
Speedy Trial
1. Gideon v. Wainwright
Gideon v. Wainwright19 dealt not with speedy trial rights but with
the question of whether the Constitution entitles indigent criminal de-
fendants to state-provided legal representation.20  The petitioner in
the case, Clarence Earl Gideon,21 was charged with a felony under
Florida law.22  During an exchange in state court, Gideon asked the
judge to appoint him counsel since he could not afford to hire an attor-
ney.23  The judge rejected his request, forcing Gideon to conduct his
own defense at trial.24
Gideon conducted his own defense and, based on the record, per-
formed relatively well.25  Nevertheless, he was convicted and sen-
tenced to five years in prison.26  Gideon later filed a habeas corpus
petition with the Florida Supreme Court, asserting that the trial
court’s failure to provide him with counsel violated his constitutional
rights.27  The Florida Supreme Court denied all relief without issuing
an opinion.28  Given that Gideon could not afford the normal costs of
appellate litigation, the Supreme Court appointed counsel and
granted certiorari.29
The Court requested that both parties discuss a particular ques-
tion on appeal: Should Betts v. Brady30 be overturned?31 Betts in-
volved a prisoner indicted for robbery who sought habeas relief on the
basis that he had been unconstitutionally denied access to legal coun-
sel.32  The Betts Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s right to coun-
sel generally applied only to federal courts and that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate that right to
19. 372 U.S. at 335.
20. Id. at 345.
21. Gideon’s story was famously told by Anthony Lewis in 1964.  Not surprisingly,
the book views Gideon’s struggle and eventual legal victory triumphantly.  For
further information, see ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (Notable Trials Li-
brary 1991) (1964).
22. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962).
31. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338.
32. Betts, 316 U.S. at 456–57.
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the states.33  The Gideon Court noted the similarities between the
facts of the two cases, particularly that both involved prisoners seek-
ing habeas relief due to the trial court declining to appoint them coun-
sel upon request.34
The Supreme Court, finding the guarantee of counsel to be funda-
mental and essential to a fair trial, rejected the conclusion in Betts
that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel could not be incor-
porated against the states.35  The Court noted, “The right to be heard
would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel.”36  In perfunctory fashion, the Court thus
overruled Betts and unanimously concluded that the Sixth Amend-
ment applies against the states to require the appointment of counsel
to indigent defendants.37
The Court’s decision in Gideon did not finally determine the fate of
Clarence Gideon.  Instead, on remand he was to have a new trial with
a new lawyer.38  A local Florida attorney, Fred Turner, represented
Gideon in this new action.39  After brief deliberation, a jury found
Gideon not guilty.40  In the immediate aftermath, the Gideon decision
and Gideon’s subsequent legal vindication were hailed as a “moving
drama” representative of a “compassionate society.”41
2. Barker v. Wingo
Barker v. Wingo42 introduced a four-part balancing test used by
courts when determining possible violations of a criminal defendant’s
speedy trial rights.43  The petitioner in the case, Barker, had been ar-
rested along with another suspect in Kentucky in 1958 on suspicion of
brutally murdering an elderly couple.44  The Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky believed that convicting the other defendant, rather than
Barker, would prove easier.45  Thus, they sought to convict the alleged
co-actor first and then have him testify against Barker.46  These stra-
33. Id. at 473.
34. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338–39.
35. Id. at 342–43.
36. Id. at 344–45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
37. Id. at 339.
38. LEWIS, supra note 21, at 226.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 237.  Gideon was reportedly asked if he felt like he had accomplished some-
thing.  He replied, “Well I did.” Id. at 238.
41. Thurman Arnold, The Criminal Trial as a Symbol, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR
TIME 161 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965) (discussing the “tremendously important
result of the moral values implicit” in Gideon and other cases).
42. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 516.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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tegic decisions led the Commonwealth to seek—over the course of five
years—sixteen continuances of Barker’s trial.47
The trial of the other defendant proved more difficult than the
Commonwealth had anticipated, and only after six trials did the pros-
ecution obtain a murder conviction that stood.48  By that point, it was
1962, and Kentucky sought further continuances before a final trial
date was set.49  During his trial, which finally occurred on October 9,
1963, Barker sought to dismiss his indictment for violation of his
Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial.50  The trial court denied the
motion, and Barker was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in
prison.51
Barker’s petition eventually found its way to the Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari.52  In its opinion considering Barker’s appeal
on Sixth Amendment grounds, the Court noted that “[t]he amorphous
quality of the right also leads to the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of
dismissal of the indictment when the right has been deprived.”53  The
Court briefly discussed and then dismissed the application of two
bright-line tests for evaluating possible violations of these rights.54
The first test would have resulted in dismissal if the state failed to
meet mandatory time limits.55  The second test would have limited
consideration of the right to those who demand a speedy trial.56 Hav-
ing duly considered and dismissed the notion of a bright-line rule, the
Court moved on to delineate a four-part test to be applied on an ad-hoc
basis in any case involving an alleged violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment’s guarantee to a speedy trial.
The Court then laid out four factors that must be assessed when
determining a possible violation of a defendant’s speedy trial rights:
(1) length of delay, (2) reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s asser-
47. Id.
48. Id. at 517.
49. Id. at 518.
50. Id.  Motions to dismiss had been filed before that time but had not specified the
speedy trial right violation. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 519.
53. Id. at 522; see also Flowers v. Conn. Corr. Inst., 853 F.2d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1988)
(acknowledging concerns with the criminal justice system in Connecticut but
finding that a greater showing is necessary for the remedy of dismissal). But see
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCI-
PLES 96–102 (1997) (proposing a different system for remedying violations of
speedy trial rights, one in which the victim would be able to bring a suit for com-
pensatory damages and would be credited with time served).  Amar argues there
is no reason that dismissal with prejudice is the logical remedy for the violation of
speedy trial rights. Id.  The current remedy, he argues, provides too much to the
guilty and too little to the innocent. Id.
54. Barker, 407 U.S. at 523–24.
55. Id. at 523.
56. Id. at 524.
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tion or non-assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.57
The Court applied these factors to the facts surrounding Barker’s con-
finement and concluded that his speedy trial rights had not been vio-
lated.58  In particular, the Court focused on the defendant’s failure to
assert his speedy trial rights for a period of over three years.59  The
Court, in dicta, speculated that he did not assert his speedy trial
rights because he thought the alleged co-actor had a chance to be
acquitted.60
The Court’s explanation of the second factor, reason for delay, is
most salient to the discussion of Vermont v. Brillon.  The Court ex-
plained that different decisional weights should be attributed to differ-
ent reasons for delay.61  For example, if the prosecution deliberately
attempts to delay the trial, such behavior should be heavily weighted
against the government.62  However, negligence or overcrowded
courts would weigh less heavily against the government, but the re-
sponsibility for those circumstances ultimately remains with the
State.63  Justice White’s concurrence expressed this last idea in differ-
ent terms:
But unreasonable delay in run of the mill criminal cases cannot be justified by
simply asserting that the public resources provided by the State’s criminal
justice system are limited and that each case must wait its turn. As the Court
points out, this approach also subverts the State’s own goals in seeking to
enforce its criminal laws.64
B. Brillon Facts and Holding
1. Facts and Procedural History
Michael Brillon was arrested for striking his girlfriend on July 27,
2001,65 and the State charged him with felony domestic assault.66
Brillon’s first counsel, Richard Ammons, filed a motion to recuse the
trial judge in October 2001.67  The motion was denied, and trial was
scheduled for February 2002.68  Citing his heavy workload, Ammons
later asked for another continuance, this one four days before jury
57. Id. at 530.
58. Id. at 536.
59. Id. at 534.
60. Id. at 535 (concluding that the defendant “definitely did not want to be tried”).
61. Id. at 531.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 538 (White, J., concurring).
65. Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1287 (2009).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1287–88.
68. Id. at 1288.
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draw.69  Brillon thereafter fired Ammons, and three days later the
trial court granted Ammons’s motion to withdraw.70
On the day that Ammons withdrew as Brillon’s attorney, the court
appointed new counsel, but he withdrew immediately because of a
conflict.71  Brillon’s third attorney, Gerard Altieri, was assigned on
March 1, 2002.  On May 20, 2002, Brillon filed a motion to dismiss
Altieri.72  He cited various reasons, including failure to communicate
and lack of diligence.73  A hearing was held to discuss these issues on
June 11, 2002.74  Altieri denied many of Brillon’s allegations and later
moved to withdraw from representation because of Brillon’s alleged
threat on his life during a break in the hearing.75  The trial court thus
granted Brillon’s motion to dismiss Altieri, but it warned him that he
was only prolonging his time in jail.76
On that same day, the trial court appointed Brillon’s fourth attor-
ney, Paul Donaldson.77  Like Ammons, Donaldson requested addi-
tional time for discovery, citing his heavy caseload.78  A few short
weeks later, Brillon complained to the court of what he considered
Donaldson’s inattention to his case.79  Two months later, Brillon filed
a motion to dismiss Donaldson, making many of the same complaints
he raised in regard to Altieri.80  A hearing was held on November 26,
at which Donaldson informed the court that his contract with the De-
fender General’s office had expired in June.81  The trial court released
Donaldson from his responsibilities.82
Brillon was without counsel for two months in between Donaldson
and Sleigh’s subsequent representation.83  David Sleigh, Brillon’s fifth
attorney, was assigned on January 15, 2003.84  Sleigh sought time ex-
tensions on discovery motions during the month of February but then
withdrew from the case on April 10 due to modifications to his firm’s
contract with the Defender General.85  Over the next four months,
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1288–89.
81. Id. at 1289.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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Brillon was not represented by counsel.86  Then, the Defender Gen-
eral’s Office informed the court that they had newly received funding
and that Brillon would be appointed a special felony unit defender.87
Kathleen Moore, Brillon’s sixth attorney, began her representation
of Brillon on August 1, 2003.  On February 23, 2004, she filed a motion
to dismiss for lack of speedy trial.88  The motion was denied and the
case proceeded to trial beginning on June 14, 2004.89  Brillon was con-
victed and sentenced to between twelve and twenty years in prison.90
The trial court denied a post-trial motion to dismiss on speedy trial
grounds, finding that the delay in bringing Brillon’s case to trial was
largely his own fault.91  The Vermont Supreme Court reversed in a
hotly contested 3–2 decision,92 holding that Brillon’s constitutional
right to a speedy trial had been violated.93
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address (1) whether delay
caused solely by indigent defense counsel can be attributed to the
State, and (2) whether the Court’s decision in Gideon results in grant-
ing broader speedy trial rights to indigent defendants than to defend-
ants who can retain private counsel.94  The Court more extensively
addressed the first question.95
The Court ultimately held that the Vermont Supreme Court erred
by charging much of the delay in the case to the State.96  The Court
also found that the Vermont Supreme Court failed to take into ac-
count Brillon’s behavior during the first year of delay, in particular his
behavior toward Altieri.97  A defendant’s deliberate attempt to disrupt
the proceedings against him, the Court reasoned, should weigh heav-
ily against the defendant.98  The Court also found that, because the
Vermont Supreme Court made no factual findings as to a systemic
breakdown in the public defender system, the delay caused by Bril-
lon’s assigned counsel must be charged to the defendant.99  Finally,
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.  Brillon’s alleged status as a habitual offender exposed him to the possibility
of a life sentence. Id. at 1287.
91. Id. at 1289.
92. See State v. Brillon, 955 A.2d 1108, 1126 (Vt. 2008) (Burgess, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that the majority freed “a convicted woman beater and habitual offender”
despite “no demonstrated prejudice”), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009).
93. Id. at 1111 (majority opinion).
94. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (No. 08-88), 2008 WL
2794278.
95. See Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283.
96. Id. at 1291.
97. Id. at 1292.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1292–93.
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the Court summarily addressed the question of whether indigent de-
fendants have broader speedy trial rights than defendants able to re-
tain private counsel:  “We see no justification for treating defendants’
speedy trial claims differently based on whether their counsel is pri-
vately retained or publicly assigned.”100
2. Majority Opinion
In the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg focused largely on the
attribution of different periods of time to either the State or the defen-
dant.101  The majority opinion broke down the period of time between
Brillon’s arrest and his eventual trial, concluding that many of these
time periods attributed to the State by the Vermont Supreme Court
were largely attributable to the defendant.102  The Court acknowl-
edged that the Defender General’s Office is a part of the criminal jus-
tice system of Vermont but found that the assigned attorneys acted on
Michael Brillon’s behalf, and not for the State.103  The Court devoted
much of the latter part of the opinion to highlighting behaviors by
Brillon that, according to the Court, substantially delayed the case
and account for much of the time Brillon spent waiting for trial.104
3. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer filed a dissent, in which Justice Stevens joined.105
The dissent argued that the writ of certiorari had been improperly
granted because the question they were called upon to review was not
at issue based on the facts of the case.106  The dissent argued that the
Vermont Supreme Court improperly attributed delays caused solely
by defendant’s counsel to the defendant and not to the State.107  The
dissent noted that the Vermont Supreme Court’s opinion is, perhaps,
marred by ambiguities that hinder the process of interpreting their
conclusions.108  The dissent concluded by reemphasizing that the writ
was improperly granted but, in the alternative, said the majority
should have upheld the Vermont Supreme Court’s opinion since that
court “has considerable authority to supervise the appointment of pub-
lic defenders.”109
100. Id. at 1292.
101. Id. at 1288–89.
102. Id. at 1288, 1291–92.
103. Id. at 1291.
104. Id. at 1291–92 (discussing Brillon’s “strident, aggressive behavior” and its sub-
stantial role in causing the delays).
105. Id. at 1293 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106. Id. See supra subsection II.B.1.
107. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. at 1293 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (“The court’s opinion for the most part makes that fact clear; at worst some
passages are ambiguous.”).
109. Id. at 1294.
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C. Interests Protected by the Right to Speedy Trial
The Sixth Amendment reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district where in the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.110
The speedy trial clause protects a number of liberty interests.  The
Court in Barker outlined three of the most important: (1) preventing
oppressive pre-trial incarcerations, (2) minimizing the anxiety and
concern of the accused, and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense
will be impaired.111  The Barker Court found the last liberty interest
to be the most important.112  Additionally, defendants awaiting trial
experience detrimental effects on their personal and professional
lives, including a lack of activities in prison conducive to being a pro-
ductive member of society.113
Akhil Amar explains that the true wrong in violating a person’s
speedy trial rights is not the trial itself, but the prolonged detention,
which serves as a form of verbal assault on the character of the ac-
cused.114  As such, an overlong detention is an “unreasonable seizure
of the person.”115  Yet, Amar has been a notable critic of the conven-
tional remedy for a violation of these rights: dismissal with
prejudice.116  He argues forcefully that dismissal with prejudice aids
the guilty, while offering little consolation to the innocent.117  As an
alternative, he proposes sentencing offsets, injunctive relief, and post-
release compensatory damages.118
110. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
111. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
112. Id.
113. Id.  See also LEWIS KATZ, ANALYSIS OF PRETRIAL DELAY IN FELONY CASES—A SUM-
MARY REPORT 1 (1972) (discussing the historical origins of the right to speedy
trial, which date to the Magna Carta).
114. AMAR, supra note 53, at 104 (“But public accusation threatens more than a per-
son’s body; it also assaults his good name.”).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 96–102; AMAR, supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also Louis M.
Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal Procedure Liber-
alism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281 (1998) (book review) (discussing the trend away from
liberal criminal procedure ideals by otherwise liberal scholars such as Amar).
117. AMAR, supra note 53, at 96–102.
118. Id. Amar is one of the leading scholars on the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amend-
ments and should be read by all those seeking to further educate themselves
about such issues. See also Carol Leboo & Laura Murray-Richards, District of
Columbia Court of Appeals Project on Criminal Procedure: X. Speedy Trial, 26
HOW. L.J. 1137, 1167 (1983) (“The right will continue to be sparingly exercised in
favor of defendants, particularly those found guilty, unless some means is found
for remedying breaches of the right short of dismissing charges.”).
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One potential problem in protecting these liberty interests and
rights is that, unlike other procedural rights, courts may find it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to determine precisely when a violation of
speedy trial rights has occurred.119  The inability of courts to use pre-
cise doctrines and focus on specific, defining events in determining
whether speedy trial rights have been violated distinguishes these
rights from their companion procedural rights in the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments.120  Thus, it is not difficult to comprehend the
struggle courts have faced in defining and protecting the important
liberty interests described by Amar and others.
III. ANALYSIS
In Vermont v. Brillon,121 the United States Supreme Court miscon-
strued the holding and limited factual findings of the Vermont Su-
preme Court by finding that it made an error of constitutional law in
ordering Michael Brillon’s convictions vacated and the charges
against him dismissed due to violations of his constitutional right to a
speedy trial.122  The lower court’s record fairly treated those periods of
delay which were solely attributable to the respondent’s counsel as not
chargeable to the State.123  Accordingly, the lower court only charged
to the State those periods of delay fairly attributable to the criminal
justice system—over which the State exercises ultimate responsibil-
ity.124  The Supreme Court’s holding will result in a weakening of
speedy trial rights for indigent defendants seeking relief under the
Sixth Amendment.  The decision also sends a confused message to
state courts seeking to vindicate speedy trial rights for indigent de-
fendants whose legal rights are affected by the negligence of the crimi-
nal justice system and their own assigned counsel.  Furthermore, the
Court ignored the realities of indigent defense in the United States125
119. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521–22 (1972) (noting the difficulty in fixing a
point in time when speedy trial rights must be exercised and in determining
when these rights are in danger, thus necessitating a “functional analysis”).
120. Id.
121. 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009).
122. Id.
123. State v. Brillon, 955 A.2d 1108, 1117–19 (Vt. 2008) (discussing various time peri-
ods in 2001 and 2002 not counted against the State but instead against the defen-
dant), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009).  The, perhaps, poor craftsmanship of the
Vermont Supreme Court’s opinion does not indicate an inadequate effort to wade
through the facts surrounding Brillon’s pre-trial delays and attempt to appropri-
ately charge time periods either to the defendant and his counsel or to the State.
124. Id. at 1122; see also 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1293 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing the Vermont Supreme Court’s holding and how ambiguities may have led to
the majority’s conclusion that delays caused solely by defense counsel were at-
tributed to the State).
125. See KATZ, supra note 113, at 10 (recommending a time limit in the disposition of
bringing cases to trial in order to realize speedy trial rights); Robert L. Spangen-
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and lost sight of Barker’s key holding—that the ultimate responsibil-
ity for speedy adjudication of criminal proceedings rests with the
state.126
A. The Court’s Flawed Analysis
The ambiguities in the Vermont Supreme Court opinion should not
have prevented the majority from recognizing the distinctions drawn
between delays attributable to the conduct of Brillon and conduct
properly attributable to the State.  Justice Ginsburg’s majority opin-
ion notes that delays sought by defendant’s counsel are ordinarily at-
tributed to the defendant.127 Barker made clear that delay
attributable to a defendant does not count against the state, but it
noted that the state has the primary responsibility for bringing cases
to trial.128  The Vermont Supreme Court’s opinion applied this princi-
ple in its own holding, only to be contradicted by the nation’s highest
court.129  To put it another way, Vermont’s Supreme Court applied the
United States Supreme Court’s own precedents more appropriately to
these facts than did the United States Supreme Court.
Justice Ginsburg, for the majority, offered her first substantive cri-
tique of the decision by writing: “The State may be charged with those
months if the gaps resulted from the trial court’s failure to appoint
replacement counsel with dispatch.  Similarly, the State may bear re-
sponsibility if there is ‘a breakdown in the public defender sys-
tem.’”130  The first part of this two-pronged attack is essentially the
same as the second; each speaks to a breakdown in the public defender
system.  The Vermont Supreme Court reached a similar holding but
also noted that inaction of assigned counsel can be attributable to the
State.131  The inaction of Michael Brillon’s assigned counsel in this
case should, at least in part, be attributable to the State, particularly
when the person confined to a jail cell implores the court to be tried for
his alleged crimes: “I have been in jail for almost a year.  I’ve got let-
berg & Tessa J. Schwartz, The Indigent Defense Crisis is Chronic: Balanced Allo-
cation of Resources is Needed to End the Constitutional Crisis, 9 CRIM. JUST. 13
(1994) (discussing extremely high caseloads and severe funding shortages among
public defenders).
126. See Brillon, 129 S. Ct. at 1291–92 (focusing on the criminal defendant gaming the
system but providing little to no discussion of the shortcomings in Vermont’s indi-
gent defense system); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 538 (1972) (White, J., con-
curring) (“But unreasonable delay in run of the mill criminal cases cannot be
justified by simply asserting that the public resources provided by the state’s
criminal justice system are limited and that each case must await its turn.”).
127. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. at 1287.
128. 407 U.S. at 529.
129. State v. Brillon, 955 A.2d 1108 (Vt. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009).
130. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. at 1287 (quoting Brillon, 955 A.2d at 1111).
131. Brillon, 955 A.2d at 1111 (discussing how inaction of assigned counsel will be
assigned to the state in some cases).
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ters here directed towards the judge about waiving my 60-day-rule.  I
want to be brought to trial.  I want to be brought to trial.”132
Despite the Vermont Supreme Court’s focus on the inaction of Bril-
lon’s assigned counsel, the court indicated early in its opinion that the
assigned attorneys’ deficiencies did not raise systemic concerns about
Vermont’s Defender General’s Office.133  The Vermont Supreme Court
made no bold sweeping claims about the Defender General’s office, but
instead it questioned whether the case represented an aberration or a
larger breakdown in the Public Defender’s Office.134  Vermont’s Su-
preme Court recognized that it had neither the resources nor the au-
thority to pursue a comprehensive study of Vermont’s Public
Defender’s Office, let alone to pass judgment on its efficacy.135  Courts
generally decide only the case before them and do not undertake large,
open-ended inquiries, since they have no taxing, spending, or lawmak-
ing power.136
The Vermont Supreme Court, in asking whether Brillon’s experi-
ence constitutes an aberration, clearly implicated a systemic break-
down in the Public Defender’s Office as its duties and obligations
related to Brillon.  The fact that the court went no further in its find-
ings does not mean that it ignored systemic factors in evaluating pos-
sible violations of Brillon’s constitutional rights.  In fact, the majority
opinion of the Vermont Supreme Court repeatedly discussed systemic
factors in its decision to dismiss the charges against Brillon.137
Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion, after mistak-
enly concluding that the Vermont Supreme Court did not implicate
systemic factors in holding that Brillon’s constitutional rights had
been violated, quickly concluded, “The Vermont Supreme Court’s opin-
ion is driven by the notion that delay caused by assigned counsel’s
‘inaction’ or failure ‘to move the case forward’ is chargeable to the
132. Brief Amici Curiae of the ACLU et al. in Support of Respondent at 9, Brillon, 129
S. Ct. 1283 (No. 08-88), 2008 WL 5417434 (citing Joint Appendix at 23, 209, Bril-
lon, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (No. 08-88), 2008 WL 4935374).  Brillon made these state-
ments during a period of time which the Vermont Supreme Court later did not
count against the State of Vermont for the purposes of Brillon’s speedy trial
claim. See Brillon, 955 A.2d at 1120.
133. Brillon, 955 A.2d at 1111–12 (discussing but not deciding the issue of whether the
State’s failure in this case was systemic or aberrational).
134. Id. at 1112.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Ex parte James, 713 So. 2d 869, 911 (Ala. 1997) (holding that a local
judge exceeded his proper judicial role).
137. See Brillon, 955 A.2d at 1111–12, 1117, 1121.  Justice Ginsburg’s insistence that
no systemic factors were implicated by the Vermont Supreme Court’s opinion
probably reflects a difference in opinion about which entities and actions should
represent those of the state.
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state, not the defendant.”138  Justice Ginsberg’s reasoning is flawed.
The Vermont Supreme Court’s conclusions regarding the inaction of
assigned counsel do not appear in a vacuum.  Rather, charging such
inaction to the State follows directly from the Vermont Supreme
Court’s finding that the system failed Michael Brillon.139  The inac-
tion of many of Brillon’s assigned attorneys140 did not alone compel
the Vermont Supreme Court’s holding.141  Systemic deficiencies lie at
the root of the Vermont Supreme Court’s holding, whether expressly
recognized or not.
B. The Court’s Mishandling of Barker
Barker stands for the proposition that lack of public resources can-
not justify unreasonable delays in the adjudication of criminal prose-
cution.142  The Vermont Supreme Court’s majority opinion
acknowledged this truism throughout the opinion.143  Variously, the
Vermont Supreme Court discussed inaction of state appointed coun-
sel,144 lack of funding for the Vermont Defender General’s Office,145
and problems associated with “the criminal justice system provided by
the state.”146  Yet, rather than applying Barker, the Supreme Court’s
majority opinion focused on the need to treat identically publicly re-
tained counsel and privately retained counsel.147  The majority feared
that treating the situations differently would result in unfair out-
comes for defendants with privately retained counsel148 and that the
relationship between counsel and client is substantially the same
whether counsel is privately retained or publicly assigned.149
One key difference between publicly assigned counsel and pri-
vately retained counsel is the role of the state.  A private party who
138. Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1291 (2009) (quoting Brillon, 955 A.2d at
1122).
139. See Brillon, 955 A.2d at 1112 (noting the court’s inability to determine whether
the failure was “an aberration or a growing crisis”).
140. Id. at 1120–21 (discussing the periods properly attributable to the defendant, in-
cluding much of his first year in detention).
141. Id. at 1112 (implicating the trial court and justice system as a whole in the viola-
tion of Brillon’s constitutional rights).
142. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 538 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (noting that
limited resources are not a proper explanation for why each case “must wait its
turn”).
143. See Brillon, 955 A. 2d 1108.
144. Id. at 1118 (relying on one of Brillon’s prior assigned attorneys for the proposition
that “there seems to be a lot of discovery that prior attorneys never got to for one
reason or another”).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1121.
147. Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1291–92 (2009).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1291.
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retains an attorney does so generally without the assistance of the
state—the transaction is ostensibly between two parties who indepen-
dently sought out a relationship.  In Vermont, as in many places, indi-
gent persons rely on the state itself to find them adequate counsel.150
The mere fact of state involvement does not prove the inadequacy of
publicly assigned counsel.  In fact, it is a certainty that there are both
capable, dedicated public defenders and poorly trained, ineffective pri-
vate attorneys.
However, substantive differences exist, and they should not be ig-
nored by the Court.  Funding problems for indigent defense services
persist even after Gideon and its progeny recognized a constitutional
right to counsel in many cases.151  Alarm has grown among some ob-
servers who believe that these funding disparities diminish the justice
system as a whole and place incredible strains on those who represent
indigent defendants.152  The American Bar Association has even is-
sued guidelines for those who represent indigent clients in an attempt
to address the problems of indigent defense and excessive
caseloads.153
The Supreme Court should have been mindful of these facts in
their opinion.  Engaging in a limited but probing factual inquiry would
not treat speedy trial claims differently based on the status of counsel.
The record in this case contained evidence of serious problems within
150. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5253(a) (1998). (“The defender general has the primary
responsibility for providing needy persons with legal services under this chapter.
He or she shall have also the duty of providing legal services to those persons in
the custody of the commissioner of corrections.  He or she may provide these ser-
vices personally, through public defenders employed under subsection 5254(a) of
this title, or through attorneys-at-law as provided by subsection (b) of this sec-
tion.  No other official or agency of the state may supervise the defender general
or assign him duties in addition to those prescribed by this chapter.  He or she
may not practice law other than in the performance of his or her duties under this
chapter or engage in any other occupation, except as provided in section 5203 of
this title.”)
151. See, e.g., NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DE-
NIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUN-
SEL: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE ix (abr. ed. 2009),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/topics/Plenary1/J_Wallace-Justice%20
Denied-AbridgedVer.pdf.
152. See Jennifer M. Allen, The Supreme Court’s Abdication of Duty in Failing to Es-
tablish Standards for Indigent Defense, 27 LAW & INEQ. 365, 406 (2009); see also
Bennett H. Brummer, The Banality of Excessive Defender Workload: Managing
the Systematic Obstruction of Justice, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. (Criminal Law Is-
sue) 104 (2009) (discussing the significant negative impact on the legal system’s
credibility caused by lack of funding for public defenders and excessive caseloads
carried by public defenders).
153. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, EIGHT
GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS (2009), avail-
able at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/downloads/eight_
guidelines_of_public_defense.pdf.
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the Vermont Defender General’s Office and evidence from one of Bril-
lon’s appointed attorneys that he had a rather large caseload.154  In-
credibly, the record indicated that Brillon’s attorney’s caseload had
recently been reduced to 174 clients with 331 charges.155  Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court largely ignored the facts showing the
troubled condition of Vermont’s Defender General’s Office and thus
opted to neglect the constitutional rights of indigent defendants.156
C. The Possible Impact of the Decision
Gideon v. Wainwright held that state courts have a responsibility
to enforce Sixth Amendment rights and, specifically, that states must
provide indigent defendants with counsel upon request.157 Gideon ex-
presses in particular terms one of the Sixth Amendment’s constitu-
tional guarantees: the right to counsel.158  To this end, the State’s
responsibility for the administration of the Defender General’s Office
was made clear by the Vermont Supreme Court,159 and it’s obvious
that appointed counsel played a significant role in the ills that affected
Michael Brillon’s journey through Vermont’s court system.160
Gideon indicated clearly that states must take appropriate mea-
sures to insure for the provision of indigent defense services.161  After
all, as one of the Justices who joined the majority in Vermont v. Bril-
154. Brief Amici Curiae of the ACLU, supra note 132, at 7 (citing Joint Appendix,
supra note 132, at 98; REPORT OF INDIGENT DEFENSE TASK FORCE 12 (2001), avail-
able at http://dgsearch.no-ip.biz/rnrfiles/IDTF.pdf).
155. Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 132, at 98).
156. See MARTIN GARBUS, COURTING DISASTER 46–80 (2002) (arguing that the Court
has shifted rightward since the early 1970s, largely through the appointment of
moderates and conservatives and very few liberals, and has accordingly ignored
the rights of those with less wealth); Allen, supra note 152, at 365. See generally,
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 394
(1993) (discussing the generally-held low opinion of public defenders but noting
their idealism); RUSSELL W. GALLOWAY, THE RICH AND POOR IN SUPREME COURT
HISTORY 1790–1990 at 181–86 (1991) (arguing that the poor and their advocates
should stay out of the Supreme Court given its history of favoring the wealthy
and should instead seek remedies in state legislatures and lower federal courts);
STANLEY ROSENBLATT, JUSTICE DENIED 295–324 (1971) (calling for a legal system
in which the poor have greater protections along with the abolition of all laws
that criminalize “victimless behavior”).
157. 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).  Many states, though not all, have responded to Gideon
with some form of state oversight over the public defender system.  Vermont is
one of these states. See SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATEWIDE INDIGENT DEFENSE SYS-
TEMS: 2005 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/
sclaid/indigentdefense/statewideinddefsystems2005.pdf.  The indigent defense
systems in this country have received intense criticism. See supra note 125 and
accompanying text; supra note 153 and accompanying text.
158. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
159. See State v. Brillon, 955 A.2d 1108, 1111 (Vt. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009).
160. Id. at 1112.
161. See Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
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lon once said in his bid to be confirmed to the Court: “My job is to call
balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.”162  If Chief Justice Roberts’s
analogy means anything, it surely stands for the idea that courts vin-
dicate rights and faithfully interpret the law, while lawmakers create
policies and avoid the violation of constitutional rights.  Thus, protect-
ing the liberty interests declared by the Sixth Amendment should be
more important than formulating properly oriented rules.163
When state courts vindicate the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants, the Supreme Court should only reverse such decisions on
the basis of an error of constitutional law.  In the absence of such er-
ror, the decision should stand.164  The Vermont Supreme Court vindi-
cated the speedy trial rights of Michael Brillon when it dismissed with
prejudice the charges against him.  The Vermont Supreme Court did
so with the support of ample factual findings and appropriate applica-
tion of relevant precedents, such as Barker.165  The United States Su-
preme Court engaged in something akin to outcome-based judging
when it overturned the decision.  Thus, an outcome-based determina-
tion may have implicitly emanated from a judicial aversion to crime
and criminals—not to mention Brillon’s history of abuse towards wo-
men—that militates in favor of him being in jail.
Similarly, the severe impact of corporate money on the political
process can be mitigated by campaign finance laws, yet those laws
were stripped away by the Supreme Court in the Citizens United166
case.  Those on the left (and right) who loathe the decision might ad-
mit that much of their dissatisfaction has less to do with the legal
reasoning than with the fact that they believe limiting corporate ex-
penditures in the political realm is beneficial to society.  This is not to
say that colorable arguments against Citizens United do not exist.
They do, with the most detailed and penetrating being Justice Ste-
vens’s dissenting opinion.167  Unlike Justice Stevens’s constitutionally
oriented dissent, the majority decision in Vermont v. Brillon focuses
on fear of defendants manipulating the system and the formulation of
a rule that will prevent this behavior.168
162. Transcript: Day One of the Roberts’ Hearings, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2004, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091300693.
html.
163. See supra section II.C.  The Sixth Amendment protects the citizen’s interest in
being free from detention and in not having his good name assaulted by the ongo-
ing accusation of criminal behavior. Id.
164. Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1294 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
165. See Brillon, 955 A.2d at 1114–15.
166. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
167. Id. at 929–31 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion ignored
almost a century’s worth of campaign finance precedent).
168. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1291–92 (2009). FRIEDMAN, supra note 156, at 457 (sum-
marizing society’s complaints about the criminal justice system and disgust with
criminals walking free due to “legal technicalities”).  The Court’s discussion of
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The Brillon majority writes principally about outcome and not
whether Vermont violated Brillon’s speedy trial rights.  The Justices
in the majority pay particular attention to his difficult behavior, such
as aggressive criticism directed at his lawyers if they failed to (in his
mind) adequately perform their assigned job and his alleged violent
threat against an assigned attorney.169  These Justices also expressed
concerns over potential inequities if the Vermont Supreme Court’s
holding was applied, such as indigent defendants being held to a more
relaxed standard with regard to speedy trial claims than defendants
who can afford privately retained counsel.170
The Court, to phrase it starkly, has it backwards.  Glaring inequi-
ties exist in the criminal justice system, and almost none of them indi-
cate that indigent defendants have any advantage over defendants
who can afford to retain counsel.171  Furthermore, the Vermont Su-
preme Court’s reasoning, if applied in other cases, merely requires ap-
plication of Barker’s balancing test.172  Additionally, the Supreme
Court and lower courts would not be burdened by doing limited factual
appraisals in cases where representation by state appointed counsel
becomes a relevant issue.  Such appraisals would not treat any party
better than another.  These inquiries simply require learned judges to
take into account the realities of the American criminal justice sys-
tem, a reality that is universally appreciated among indigent defend-
ants and their assigned attorneys.173
Given the recentness of the decision, it is hard to predict how fu-
ture state and federal courts will react.  The Vermont Supreme Court
cited the Sixth Amendment as the primary basis for its decision,174
allowing the Supreme Court to properly invoke their review authority
in granting certiorari.175  Future courts may be wise to rely on their
own state constitutions so as to avoid any conflict with the Supreme
manipulation of the system by criminal defendants hints at some of the same
complaints voiced during the backlash of the 1960s and 1970s against perceived
outrages in the criminal justice system.  Supra subsection II.B.2; see also WIL-
LIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH 183–87 (1999) (arguing that mistrust and
lack of faith in the justice system is due to weakness in the trial system, specifi-
cally because the procedural hoops and hurdles of a full trial lead most cases to be
plea bargained).
169. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1292 (2009).
170. Id.
171. See supra section III.B; supra note 152 and accompanying text.
172. See supra section III.B.
173. See supra note 125 and accompanying text; supra note 156 and accompanying
text.
174. See State v. Brillon, 955 A.2d 1108, 1114 (Vt. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009).
175. See Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1289–90 (2009).
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-2\NEB201.txt unknown Seq: 20 29-NOV-10 14:24
2010] THE SILENCE OF GIDEON’S TRUMPET 415
Court.176  The Court’s decision has already been cited by a number of
lower courts.177  The court in United States ex rel. Brown v. Shaw
mentions the obvious upshot from the Supreme Court’s decision:
courts must implement rules regarding indigent defense based on the
policy consideration that rules favorable to criminal defendants will be
abused by either the defendant or defendant’s counsel.178
Federal courts have approvingly, or without comment, cited the
Brillon decision, an unsurprising fact.179 State courts have largely
done the same,180 and Commonwealth v. Baird181 explains accurately
that, while exceptions exist outside the systemic breakdowns of state
public defender offices for speedy trial purposes, defendants must
overcome a relatively high bar in order to prevail on such argu-
ments.182 Baird highlights a larger issue with the “systemic break-
down exception,” namely, that with the bar seemingly set so high by
the Court, state courts adopting the reasoning supplied by Brillon will
be unlikely to perform sufficient inquiry to determine a potential sys-
temic breakdown.  Instead, courts will likely conduct a perfunctory in-
quiry into the issue and quickly conclude that the actions of appointed
counsel should normally count against the defendant and not the
state.
The Brown court correctly summarized the holding and policy ra-
tionales of the Supreme Court.  Legal observers often discuss how so-
ciety mistrusts criminal defendants and their legal representation and
believes that more must be done to end the charade of technicalities
that seemingly accompany legal proceedings in this country.183  The
176. See Arreola v. Municipal Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d. 108, 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(reviewing possible speedy trial rights violation under California’s state constitu-
tion and state statutory provisions).
177. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Brown v. Shaw, No. 09 C 2837, 2009 WL 5166220,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2009) (discussing the “perverse incentive” that would re-
sult from a rule contrary to that adopted by the United States Supreme Court);
State v. Mumley, 978 A.2d 6, 12 (Vt. 2009) (acknowledging the reversal on other
grounds by the United States Supreme Court).
178. See Brown, 2009 WL 5166220 at *4 (referring to the potential for public defenders
to “drag their feet” in hopes of getting a case dismissed on speedy trial grounds).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, No. 09-10025, 2010 WL 850241, at *7 (11th
Cir. Mar. 12, 2010); Keomanivong v. Jacquez, No. 2:07-cv-02409-JWS, 2010 WL
843755, at *7 n.25 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2010) (mem.).
180. See, e.g., People v. Lomax, 234 P.3d 377, 401 (Cal. 2010) (discussing how a “delib-
erate attempt to disrupt proceedings” should weigh heavily against the defen-
dant) (internal quotation marks omitted); Jakupovic v. State, 695 S.E.2d 247, 250
(Ga. 2010).
181. 975 A.2d 1113 (Pa. 2009).
182. Id. at 1119 (discussing the non-exclusive nature of the exception identified in
Brillon but concluding that its “character” indicates a “fairly high” bar).
183. See supra note 168 and accompanying text; supra note 157 and accompanying
text.  Such endemic mistrust and suspicion of criminal defendants is probably
even stronger in the case of a defendant like Michael Brillon, a man accused of
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law, however, should not be saved from the obvious outcomes dictated
by its textual priorities184 because criminal defendants sometimes
“game” the system.  Also, the Court should not send to lower courts a
message that rules strengthening the rights of criminal defendants in-
herently lead to abuse either by defendants themselves or their attor-
neys.  The particular facts of this case do not indicate how a contrary
rule, one recognizing the fundamental differences between privately
retained counsel and state appointed counsel, will lead to “perverse
incentives” for assigned counsel to delay the case in order to have it
overturned on speedy trial grounds.185
When courts inquire, even on a limited scale, they should and al-
most certainly would turn up evidence of criminal defendants deceiv-
ing and manipulating the system.  A competent court can recognize
the difference between the state’s systemic negligence or intentional
wrongdoing and assigned counsel behaving frivolously to delay the
proceedings.  The Court gives criminal defendants and their assigned
counsel far too much credit for creative and duplicitous delaying tac-
tics, given what is known about the indigent defense system in this
country and its harmful effects on criminal defendants.186  If the
Brown decision is representative, Brillon will have left a sad legacy of
mistrust in the public defender systems on which indigent defendants
stake their lives.
D. Greater Rights in Appellate Courts?
In Brillon, the ACLU’s amicus brief187 discusses the use of Barker
in the appellate context, noting that the courts have been weighing
breakdowns in the public defender system against the state.  This line
of reasoning has been applied consistently across a number of cir-
cuits—including the Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth.  Addi-
tionally, a number of state courts and the Armed Forces Court of
Appeals apply this reasoning when inquiring into appellate delays.188
The appellate process is different than the pre-trial process in which
abusing women and possessing a documented record of disrespect to the court
and its officers.
184. See supra section II.C.
185. See Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1292 (2009) (speculating that assigned
counsel could engineer a dismissal on speedy trial grounds after seeking an un-
reasonable number of continuances).
186. See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text; infra section III.D.
187. Brief Amici Curiae of the ACLU et al. in Support of Respondent, supra note 132,
at 18.
188. Id. (discussing the appellate approach to delays caused by indigent defendant’s
counsel). But see United States v. DeLeon, 444 F.3d 41, 58 (1st Cir. 2006) (dis-
cussing the general inapplicability of the Barker approach to the appellate con-
text); see also Marc M. Arkin, Speedy Criminal Appeal: Right Without Remedy, 74
MINN. L. REV. 437, 473–80 (1990) (arguing that Barker’s approach is not particu-
larly useful in the appellate context).
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-2\NEB201.txt unknown Seq: 22 29-NOV-10 14:24
2010] THE SILENCE OF GIDEON’S TRUMPET 417
speedy trial rights may be implicated.  Many courts, however, have
adopted the Barker four-part framework in the appellate context, find-
ing similar interests implicated by both contexts.189
The protection afforded to convicted defendants seeking post-trial
appellate review is even more necessary in the context of a defendant
not yet brought to trial.  A defendant who has been processed through
the criminal justice system—presumably including a constitutionally
sound proceeding—has less of a claim to constitutional protections
than a defendant not yet brought to trial.  A defendant not yet brought
to trial continues to suffer any number of indignities and affronts to
his reputation through prolonged detention and accusation,190 despite
that such a defendant is still presumed to be innocent.
Regardless of these apparent truths, the post-trial defendant has
been afforded greater protections through the Barker framework in
those jurisdictions adopting it for the post-trial context.  Courts regu-
larly charge delays caused by ineffective state appointed counsel
against the state in the appellate context.191  Yet, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Brillon discussed hesitancy to adopt a rule in
which delays attributable to state appointed counsel regularly count
against the state for speedy trial purposes.  The Court’s primary con-
cern appears to be the manipulation of the system by the criminal de-
fendant and his attorney.192  Given the existence of decisions charging
delays caused by ineffective state appointed counsel to the state in
appellate proceedings, the trial-level concerns of the Court in Brillon
appear all the more inconsistent and outcome-oriented.  If the rule
mandated that all delays in proceedings would be attributable to the
state—no matter the circumstances—gaming of the system by crimi-
nal defendants would be a valid concern.
However, there is no compelling reason that this simplistic formu-
lation would constitute the rule.  The Barker balancing test performs a
probing inquiry, looking at the behavior of both parties as it seeks to
attribute delays to one side or the other.  The same should be done for
determining whether the court attributes to the state a delay in pro-
ceeding to trial.  For the sake of comparison, imagine one public de-
fender (Defender A) who repeatedly requests continuances on behalf
of his client (Client A) despite having a moderate case load and no
189. See supra note 154, at 19–24; see also Brook A. Brewer, Rapist Goes Free After
“Doing Time” at Home: Jolly v. State, 58 ARK. L. REV. 679 (2005) (contending that
the Barker four-part framework should also be applied to sentencing delays and
that this issue invites review by the Supreme Court).
190. See AMAR, supra note 53, at 104; supra section II.C.
191. See supra note 154, at 18.
192. See Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1292 (2009) (“A contrary conclusion could
encourage appointed counsel to delay proceedings by seeking unreasonable con-
tinuances.”); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972) (“Delay is not an uncom-
mon defense tactic.”).
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pressing need to request the continuance.  Whatever Defender A’s in-
tentions may be, a court looking at this behavior would be hard-
pressed to attribute this delay to the state, despite the defender being
part of the state’s criminal justice system.  Defender A’s actions are
attributable solely to Defender A and, vicariously, to his client.  In-
deed, Client A, assuming he takes no part in this legal stratagem, may
well be disadvantaged by his lawyer seeking unnecessary continu-
ances, but it is his responsibility to notify the state of deficiencies in
Defender A’s representation.  The time a defendant spends sitting in
jail before being tried should be limited but, for policy reasons, De-
fender A’s suspicious and unnecessary continuances should not auto-
matically be charged against the state if Defender A is independently
responsible for the delays.
Now imagine another public defender (Defender B) who maintains
a heavy caseload and only meets briefly with his client (Client B).  In
fact, Defender B will soon be leaving the public defender system in
search of greater fulfillment in his legal career.  He communicated his
intentions the public defender’s office but that information never
reached the court, and the public defender’s office took no action to
find a suitable replacement for Client B.  Due to the failure to act on
Defender B’s stated intention to leave the public defender’s office, not
to mention Defender B’s heavy case load, Client B sits in jail for an-
other four months before the court appoints a public defender to take
over his case.  Justice and precedent dictate that this four-month de-
lay be attributed to the state.  The heavy caseload imposed by the
state, along with the lawyer’s transition into another line of work,
caused a lack of progress in this case.  The state has a responsibility to
administer the public defender system, which includes a responsibility
to keep cases moving forward at an equitable pace.  The described de-
lay for Client B should not weigh as heavily against the state as inten-
tional misconduct, but the state must take ultimate responsibility
whether the context is post or pre-trial delay.
IV. CONCLUSION
Gideon declared that the Sixth Amendment makes certain the in-
digent defendant’s constitutional right to counsel.  Today, the Court
must recognize the interplay between Gideon and possible infringe-
ment of constitutional rights, such as speedy trial rights.  The ineffi-
cacy of appointed counsel may lead to infringing upon speedy trial
rights, thus putting the Court in the position of evaluating the viola-
tion of speedy trial rights caused—in whole or in part—by appointed
counsel pursuant to the Gideon decision.
If the Court chooses not to vindicate those rights, it places itself in
the peculiar position of mandating the right to counsel for indigent
defendants but ignoring those indigent defendants when they seek
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vindication of speedy trial rights due to the inadequacies of appointed
counsel.  In essence, the Court blames the inadequacy of the indigent
defense system, which was mandated by the Court’s decision in
Gideon, on the defendant.  In Brillon, the Vermont Supreme Court
rightfully attributed delays caused by the inadequacies of the state-
run Defender General’s Office to the State of Vermont.  The Supreme
Court made a mistake in reversing that decision.
That is not to say that the Court must always find for the defen-
dant when he seeks vindication of speedy trial rights.  Any such deci-
sion rests on the facts of each case and the realities faced by each
indigent defendant.  The Court failed to close the shortfall between
Gideon’s forceful declarations of indigent right to counsel and the real-
ity of America’s broken indigent defense system when it refused to
vindicate the constitutional rights of Michael Brillon.
